Thursday, July 16, 2015

Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, Part 11

In the previous part, we moved away from emulation to working with physical hardware. We identified a UART header inside the Netgear R6200 that can be used for console access. I demonstrated how to access the CFE bootloader's recovery mode to reflash a working firmware over TFTP. This makes it possible to iteratively modify and test firmware images that will be used in the SetFirmware UPnP exploit.

In this part, I'll talk about regenerating the filesystem portion of the firmware image. I'll also walk through shrinking the filesystem in order to avoid crashing upnpd.

Updated Exploit Code

I last updated the exploit code for part 9, when we filled out the "janky" ambit header enough to satisfy upnpd. In this part I've updated the code to add an additional header field that must be filled in order to boot. If you've previously cloned the repository, now would be a good time to do a pull. You can clone the git repo from:

Regenerating the Filesystem

Recall from before that the firmware image for the R6200 consists of four parts:
  • Proprietary "Ambit" header
  • TRX header, which is well documented
  • Compressed Linux kernel
  • Squashfs filesystem
We reverse engineered the ambit header by analyzing the httpd and upnpd binaries. The TRX header is well documented and did not need to be reversed. We can reuse the Linux kernel from an existing firmware; no changes to it are required. All that remains is regenerating the SquashFS filesystem.

Generating a SquashFS filesystem is relatively straightforward; there are existing tools to turn a root filesystem directory into a filesystem image. The problem lies in the many different variations of SquashFS. In addition to the various official versions, vendors tweak it further for their own motivations. As a result of this proliferation of SquashFS variations, it can be hard to know which SquashFS tool will work with a given device. For this project, we're in luck. Netgear makes available open source GPL archives for most of its consumer products, including the R6200.

While vendors' open source releases aren't as useful as one might hope, they do sometimes include a few gems. In the case of the R6200, the GPL release includes a few tools already compiled and ready to use. You can download the GPL release from:
http://kb.netgear.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/2649/~/netgear---open-source-code-for-programmers-(gpl)

The GPL release for the R6200 firmware version 1.0.0.28 (which we're working with) can be found here.

When you unpack the rather large GPL tarball, you can find the SquashFS tools under src/router/squashfs:


zach@devaron:~/code/wifi-reversing/netgear/r6200/gpl/R6200-V1.0.0.28_1.0.24_src/src/router/squashfs (0) $ ls -1
global.h
LzFind.o
LzmaDec.o
LzmaEnc.o
Makefile
mksquashfs*
mksquashfs.c
mksquashfs.h
mksquashfs.o
read_fs.c
read_fs.h
read_fs.o
sort.c
sort.h
sort.o
sqlzma.c*
sqlzma.h*
sqlzma.o
unsquashfs.c

You'll find the source code, as well as a precompiled mksquashfs binary. Oddly, there are even intermediate objects from compilation. I always get the feeling that GPL releases from router vendors are just someone's workspace that got tarred up and posted online. Anyway, the mksquashfs binary is the one that I used. It's 32-bit, so I had to install lib32stdc++6 in my 64-bit Ubuntu VM. In theory, you should be able to rebuild the tools from source as well, but I didn't try. I put the executable in my path (~/bin in my case) so I can easily call it from scripts. I also gave it a unique name to differentiate from other SquashFS utilities.

In order to regenerate a filesystem image, you run mksquashfs on the root directory and give it the -noappend and -all-root options:


zach@devaron:~/tmp_root (0) $ netgear-r6200-mksquashfs squashfs-root rootfs.bin -noappend -all-root
Parallel mksquashfs: Using 4 processors
Creating little endian 3.0 filesystem using LZMA on rootfs.bin, block size 65536.
TIOCGWINZ ioctl failed, defaulting to 80 columns
[==============================================================] 1024/1024 100%
Exportable Little endian filesystem, data block size 65536, compressed data, compressed metadata, compressed fragments, duplicates are removed
Filesystem size 7340.21 Kbytes (7.17 Mbytes)
 28.14% of uncompressed filesystem size (26081.84 Kbytes)
Inode table size 6840 bytes (6.68 Kbytes)
 24.26% of uncompressed inode table size (28199 bytes)
Directory table size 8018 bytes (7.83 Kbytes)
 48.05% of uncompressed directory table size (16688 bytes)
Number of duplicate files found 15
Number of inodes 853
Number of files 711
Number of fragments 82
Number of symbolic links  90
Number of device nodes 0
Number of fifo nodes 0
Number of socket nodes 0
Number of directories 52
Number of uids 1
 root (0)
Number of gids 0
zach@devaron:~/tmp_root (0) $

The first argument is the name of the root directory to convert to an image. The "rootfs.bin" is the name of the image to generate. The "-noappend" option means to not append to an existing image, and the "-all-root" option means to set ownership of all files to root.

Shrinking the Filesystem.

When we generate the root filesystem, it comes out to be over 7MB. There are additional options to mksquashfs that affect compression and block size and can impact the resulting image size. I wasn't able to get the resulting image to come out any smaller regardless of what options I used. In some cases, it ended up larger.


$ ls -l rootfs.bin
-rwx------ 1 zach 80 7520256 Mar 25 07:45 rootfs.bin*

Lets revisit binwalk's breakdown of the firmware's composition.


$ binwalk R6200-V1.0.0.28_1.0.24.chk

DECIMAL    HEX        DESCRIPTION
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
58         0x3A       TRX firmware header, little endian, header size: 28 bytes, image size: 8851456 bytes, CRC32: 0xEE839C0 flags: 0x0, version: 1
86         0x56       LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 65536 bytes, uncompressed size: 3920006 bytes
1328446    0x14453E   Squashfs filesystem, little endian, non-standard signature,  version 3.0, size: 7517734 bytes,  853 inodes, blocksize: 65536 bytes, created: Wed Sep 19 19:27:19 2012

Binwalk identifies the following parts:
  • Ambit header (unidentified by binwalk) 58 bytes
  • TRX Header: 28 Bytes
  • Compressed Kernel: 1328360 bytes (~1300 KB)
  • SquashFS filesystem: 7523068 bytes (~7400 KB)
We can't change the size of the headers or of the kernel. So that leaves us with only the filesystem. If the total firmware size is to come in under 4MB, we need to get the filesystem down to around 2,700 KB or less. That's down from 7,400 KB. Obviously, there's no way to get a full firmware to fit in this size, or even one that approximates a full firmware.

So what can we do with such a small firmware? Is there even a point in this exercise? My strategy was to strip down the firmware as much as possible to come in under the limit, but still have the router do the following:

  • boot successfully
  • have a functioning userspace, including shell
  • have network connectivity, including to the internet


This first stage firmware should have some sort of agent that phones home to a predetermined server to download a second stage image. It should flash that image, and reboot. The second stage firmware will be a full blown firmware that looks identical to the stock firmware, but contains whatever additional tools and remote access capability we want.

Our goal is to figure out what we can strip out of this firmware while leaving it with a minimum level of functionality to bootstrap the second stage. The uncompressed filesystem takes up 28MB.


$ du -hs rootfs
28M rootfs

There are a number of executables that are tempting to remove, as they seem noncritical. Before doing so, be sure they aren't links to /bin/busybox. Removing a link won't save significant space. The only way to save space with these executables is to rebuild busybox with fewer personalities.

The first thing that can go is the HTTP server and its resources. The www directory takes 4.6 MB on disk, and httpd takes 1.6 MB.

Removing a system service can be risky. On embedded devices such as this one, the boot sequence can be pretty brittle. Unlike a general purpose Ubuntu or Red Hat server, these are designed with the assumption that no components will be added or removed. If a service is removed that is critical to the boot process, the device may be rendered unusable. To reduce this risk, I replaced any removed system executables with a shell script of the same name that terminates with a successful exit status. This should trick whatever init or rc program is kicking off boot processes into thinking the service started successfully, thereby allowing the boot sequence to proceed uninterrupted.

Here's a script that replaces a given system binary with a dummy script:


#!/bin/sh

echo "Replacing $1"

cat <<EOF >$1
#!/bin/sh

echo "Fake $1"

EOF

chmod +x $1

You simply run it like so, to replace a given service:

$ cd rootfs/usr/sbin/
$ replace httpd
Replacing httpd
$ cat httpd
#!/bin/sh

echo "Fake httpd"

$


As I removed each service, I generated a new, complete firmware image and installed it through the R6200's web interface to be sure the device would still boot and had network connectivity. Of course even it it does boot and run, you've now removed the web interface. This means there's no facility to reinstall the factory firmware. You'll need to recover via the serial interface I described in part 10. Using the serial console, you can recover using the bootloader's TFTP server.

For each service you remove, there may be shared libraries that are no longer needed. Those can be removed as well. An easy trick is to grep all the remaining executables for a given library's name. Here's a script you can paste into the terminal as a one-liner that will use grep to discover what executables link what shared libraries.


libs=~/libs.txt; 
for file in *.so*; do
    echo "$file" >> $libs;
    echo "==============================" >> $libs;
    grep -rn "$file" ../sbin >> $libs;
    grep -rn "$file" ../usr/sbin >> $libs;
    echo "" >> $libs;
done

The libs.txt file will contain entries like:


libvolume_id.so.0
==============================

libvolume_id.so.0.78.0
==============================

libvorbis.so.0
==============================
Binary file ../usr/sbin/minidlna.exe matches


The libvolume_id.so shared library evidently isn't linked by anything and can be removed. The libvorbis.so shared library is linked by the DLNA service and may be removed once that service is removed. Re-run the script to generate a new list of library references each time you remove a service. This was a lengthy, iterative process for me. You may remove a critical service by accident or you may remove a library that is critical but not linked directly. It's important to test that each change results in a firmware which will still boot.

After we remove httpd and the www directory, the new root file system is just over 7000KB. That leaves 4300 KB to go. Keep repeating this process of removing services from /usr/sbin and /sbin, and corresponding libraries that have no references. Make your changes a few at a time so you know what to put back if the device is no longer functional after rebooting.

Here's a list of executables I removed


/bin/chkntfs
/bin/wps_monitor
/lib/udev/vol_id
/sbin/pppd
/sbin/pppdv6
/usr/local/samba/nmbd
/usr/local/samba/smbd
/usr/local/samba/smb_pass
/usr/sbin/bftpd
/usr/sbin/bzip2
/usr/sbin/ddnsd
/usr/sbin/dhcp6c
/usr/sbin/dhcp6s
/usr/sbin/dlnad
/usr/sbin/email
/usr/sbin/gproxy
/usr/sbin/heartbeat
/usr/sbin/httpd
/usr/sbin/IPv6-relay
/usr/sbin/l2tpd
/usr/sbin/lld2d
/usr/sbin/minidlna.exe
/usr/sbin/mld
/usr/sbin/nas
/usr/sbin/outputimage
/usr/sbin/pppoecd
/usr/sbin/pppoecdv6
/usr/sbin/pptp
/usr/sbin/radvd
/usr/sbin/ripd
/usr/sbin/telnetenabled
/usr/sbin/upnpd
/usr/sbin/wanled
/usr/sbin/wl
/usr/sbin/wpsd
/usr/sbin/zebra
/usr/sbin/zeroconf


Those are in addition to the /www directory. Once I had removed those, I identified the following libraries that were no longer linked.


/lib/libavcodec.so.52
/lib/libavdevice.so.52
/lib/libavformat.so.52
/lib/libavutil.so.49
/lib/libcrypto.so
/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.7
/lib/libcrypt.so.0
/lib/libexif.so.12
/lib/libFLAC.so.8
/lib/libid3tag.so.0
/lib/libjpeg.so.7
/lib/libnsl.so.0
/lib/libogg.so.0
/lib/libpthread.so.0
/lib/libresolv.so.0
/lib/libsqlite3.so.0
/lib/libssl.so
/lib/libssl.so.0.9.7
/lib/libutil.so.0
/lib/libvolume_id.so.0
/lib/libvolume_id.so.0.78.0
/lib/libvorbis.so.0
/lib/libz.so.1


With all of these libraries and executables removed, the root filesystem directory was down to 9.8MB from 28 MB. The compressed SquashFS filesystem was down to 2,228KB! That's from a starting point 7.2MB. After building the complete ambit image (with ambit header, TRX header, kernel, and filesystem), it came to 4121918 bytes, or 0x3EE53E in hex. Recall the undersized malloc() for Base64 decoding was 0x400000. That's 70KB to spare! Kick ass[1].

Checksum Mismatch!

Now we can try uploading our minimized firmware to the R6200 using the UPnP SetFirmware exploit code[2]. At this point, you definitely need to connect to the UART serial interface if you haven't already. Even if the firmware boots, we've stripped out all the essential services, so there's no other way to see what's happening or what state the device is in after boot. And if it doesn't boot, well, you'll be glad you have the serial connection and CFE's recovery mode.

When I built a firmware and pushed it to the device over UPnP, exploiting the SetFirmware vulnerability, I was able to see the updating progress over the serial console. And then the R6200 rebooted. So close! After the reboot, I saw CFE initializing. And then this.

CFE Checksum Mismatch
The CFE bootloader detects a firmware checksum mismatch.

On boot we see:
Image chksum: 0x61354161
Calc  chksum: 0x9F3FAE72

Then the boot sequence halts, and CFE helpfully starts up a TFTP server for us.

The image checksum, 0x61354161, looks familiar. Let's go back to the firmware generating script and find_offset().

$ ./firmware-parsing/mjambit.py find=0x61354161 kernel-lzma.bin ../small-fw/rootfs.bin
 [@] TRX crc32: 0x77dec742
 [@] Creating ambit header.
 [+] Calculating TRX image checksum.
 [+] Building header without checksum.
 [+] Calculating header checksum.
 [+] Building header with checksum.
 [@] Finding offset of 0x61354161
 [+] Offset: 16

Oh look. That's the 4-byte value at offset 16. We discovered what field is when for when reversing httpd. From part 7:

We're not done with checksums just yet. The basic block at 0x0043643C is another checksum operation. Once again the data points to "HDR0", but the size is only the value from offset 28. The size from offset 24 is not used this time. The checksum result is the same as before, but this time compared to the value at offset 16. We now know the checksum we compute and store at offset 32, must also be stored at offset 16. Presumably, this would be to calculate a separate checksum without including the mysterious extra section I speculated about above.
So, even though this field is never validated in upnpd (which is why we didn't find it the second time around), it does get checked by CFE at boot. In fact if we had gone a little farther with static analysis, there is a section where sa_parcRcvCmd() seeks to the end of the flash partition, unlocks and erases the last erase-size (65536) bytes, seeks to 8 bytes the end, then writes the values from field 24, the TRX image size, and from field 16, the TRX image checksum.

lseek, write trx image size, checksum
Writing the TRX image size and checksum to the end of the flash partition.

This problem is easily solved. We already have the TRX image size at offset 24. That's the size that got checked against a limit of 4MB. It's also the size that is used to determine how much data to write to flash. We just need to add the TRX checksum at offset 16:


SC.gadget_section(self.TRX_IMG_CHECKSUM_OFF_1,self.trx_image_checksum,
                  description="Checksum of TRX image. This gets verified by CFE on boot.")

With that done (and the router recovered back to a stock firmware), we can try again. And when we do, success! The router boots up completely to an interactive console.

Minimal R6200 firmware booted


Let's take a break for a second and reflect on where we are. We've successfully exploited a broken, abandoned, and forgotten capability in order to upload a firmware that we control to the Netgear R6200 over the network without authentication. We had to overcome the following challenges to get here:
  • Reverse engineer the UPnP daemon
  • Come up with silly timing games necessary to work around the broken networking code.
  • Binary patch, emulate, and debug upnpd and httpd.
  • Work out what the SOAP request should look like since the “parsing” is just bunch of strstr()’s against the *entire* HTTP request, and spread across a whole bunch of different functions
  • Reverse engineer the legitimate firmware format, as parsed by httpd.
  • Reverse engineer how upnpd parses the firmware format.
A few things remain before we can declare victory. We need to:
  • Embed a tool in the minimized stage 1 firmware image that will download the larger stage 2 firmware.
  • Successfully write the downloaded firmware to flash so that CFE is satisfied and will boot it.
  • Embed some sort of backdoor in the larger firmware. After all, that's the point of the exercise, right?
Before wrapping up the series, I'll discuss all three of these things. Before that, though, I'll discuss an intermittent crasher due to an invalid free() that you may or may not have encountered. Avoiding it is necessary to ensure the router reboots into the stage 1 firmware. I'll talk about how we can abuse the firmware header in such a way as to prevent crashing.


------------------------------
[1] When I did this project the first time around, back in December 2013 and January 2014, I hadn't discovered samba hiding out in /usr/local/samba. After deleting all the nonessential stuff from /usr/sbin and /lib, the SquashFS filesystem was still about a MB over the 2.7MB we need. What I ultimately did back then was to delete the (huge!) 4.1MB wl.ko from /lib/modules/2.6.22/kernel/drivers/net/wl. This, unfortunately, is the kernel module for the wireless hardware. Deleting this meant when the system booted there would be no WiFi. The system still worked and had network connectivity, but this was a very intrusive modification that I was never really happy with. Fortunately, finding the Samba installation in a non-standard directory means we don't need to remove the wireless driver.

[2] This is in the git repository linked earlier. The exploit script is setfirmware.py.

Thursday, July 09, 2015

Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, Part 10

Debugging and De-bricking the Netgear R6200 via UART

Update: I forgot to credit my former colleague, Tim (@bjt2n3904), for helping me locate the UART header. This project would have been way more challenging without the serial connection. It would have involved desoldering the flash memory chip, probably replacing it with a ZIF socket, and then removing and reprogramming the chip for each iteration of testing.

In the previous installment, we filled out the ambit firmware header just enough to satisfy Netgear's broken UPnP server. We also patched out several ioctl() calls in upnpd in order to test the SetFirmware exploit in emulation.

We're now at the point that emulation is no longer adequate; we need to start testing against actual hardware. There are subtle and not-so-subtle differences between emulation and hardware that affect how the exploit works. Some exploits, such as command injections and even buffer overflows, can be tested and developed entirely in emulation. Since this exploit writes a firmware image to flash memory, we need to ensure it is written to physical storage properly and will successfully boot and run.

Experimentation with modifying a device's firmware calls for some sort of connectivity at a lower level than just a Linux shell. If the operating system fails to boot, there is no shell. We'll need to connect to the device in order to diagnose the problem and recover. The iterative process of developing the small, bootstrap firmware that I will describe later entails many incomplete builds that will leave the device in a semi-broken state. Knowing that you can recover by restoring a good firmware makes the project much less risky.

What you'll need for this part:
  • USB to UART cable (described below)
  • Soldering iron
  • Torx screwdriver set (I like this one)
  • Solid copper wire in a few colors (I think 22 gauge is fine here)
  • 3 male-to-female jumper wires of different colors (black, orange, and yellow are ideal)

Hunting for  UART Header

Fortunately the R6200 has a UART header you can connect to using a serial terminal application such as Minicom. With Minicom, you can interact with the bootloader to see diagnostic messages and even drop into a recovery console.

To interface with the R6200's UART, you can use a cable like the FTDI 3.3V USB to Serial cable, (part number TTL-232R-3V3-2MM). It's available from Allied Electronics, AmazonSparkFun, and others.

ftdi usb-serial
USB to UART cable for serial debugging


The UART connection isn't exactly set up and ready for you to use, though. This means taking apart your router and heating up your soldering iron.

There are couple of torx screws that hold the base on.

R6200 Bottom Screws

Then there are a couple more torx screws that hold the outer shell together. These are the same size as the previous ones, but different length. Keep them organized if you plan to put the router back together.


R6200 screws
More screws.


With the outer screws removed, you can start separating the front and back half of the clamshell. There are plastic tabs all the way around that hold it together. I broke a few trying to get it open. Once you get the front half off, you'll find the PCB held in by more torx screws.

R6200 inside screws

Once you remove the PCB, you can locate the UART header, which is exposed as four solder pads.


UART header pinout


The solder pads, from left to right, are VCC, ground, transmit, and receive. You don't need VCC; it's +3.3V power. The USB adapter is powered by your computer's USB port, instead. That leaves ground, TX, and RX. The transmit and receive are relative to the device, so transmit from the device connects to receive of your cable and vice versa. Solder short leads to the appropriate pads, and connect your jumper wires to them. Then, route the jumpers out of the case so you can access the UART once you reassemble your router. I drilled a small hole in the top for a passthrough.

Here's how the UART header maps to the USB adapter's pinout:

  • Device GND <-> Adapter GND (black)
  • Device TX <-> Adapter RX (yellow)
  • Device RX <-> Adapter TX (orange)
If you have orange, yellow, and black jumpers, connecting them up so the colors match the USB adapter will save you some trouble. Sadly, I had green, pink, and blue on hand, so mine is exciting and confusing every time I hook it up.


Passthrough for UART Leads

Then, I zip-tied the leads to reduce stress on them.

R6200 UART Leads Zip-tied


Connecting Using Minicom

You may want to test the serial connection before reassembling. The baud rate is 115,200 and serial port settings should be 8,N,1. Here's my mincom configuration for the R6200. Obviously adjust your ttyUSB device as appropriate, but it's usually /dev/ttyUSB0.

########################################################################
# Minicom configuration file - use "minicom -s" to change parameters.
pu port             /dev/ttyUSB0
pu baudrate         115200
pu bits             8
pu parity           N
pu stopbits         1
pu rtscts           No
########################################################################

When you connect with Minicom and power on the R6200, you can see the boot text scrolling across the console. If you let it boot, and hit return in the console, it gives you a root prompt. It's not a great terminal environment, though. There's no scrollback, for example. Once you have a serial console, use netgear-telnetenable[1] to fire up the telnet backdoor.

Shitty terminal environments aside, the serial console is great for restoring to a non-broken firmware. As long as nothing trashed the flash partition that contains the CFE boot loader, you can break in to a debug prompt and do a restore.

When you first power on the device and see CFE loading, break in with ctrl+c. You need to break in right after CFE starts, but before it finishes loading the kernel and operating system from flash. Incidentally, this gets trickier after we shrink the firmware down from nearly 9MB to under 4MB because the load time shortens dramatically, narrowing the window when you can break in.

Recovering a Bricked Router

If you break in at just the right time (I just mash ctrl+c repeatedly), you should get a CFE> prompt. Once you've got the prompt you can start up CFE's TFTP server with the tftpd command to restore a factory firmware.
CFE Firmware Recovery over Serial


The router's network configuration is 192.168.1.1/24. There's no DHCP server in this mode, so you'll need to configure your own network interface manually. You'll need a tftp client to upload the firmware image. TIP: Be sure to switch your client to binary mode. This gets me every time.

When you reboot, the router should be back to normal. Now you can iteratively test custom firmware knowing that it only takes a minute or two to restore back to a good one.

In the next part, we'll regenerate the SquashFS filesystem. We'll also work on shrinking the firmware down to 4MB to avoid crashing upnpd during exploitation. We'll need to hunt down and eliminate nonessential services, while avoiding breaking the boot sequence. Stay tuned!

------------------------------
[1] Did you know that nearly every one of Netgear's consumer devices has a well-known but unacknowledged backdoor? It's true. What the fuck are we even doing here. Who needs trojaned firmware when Netgear devices already have a backdoor. http://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/netgear/telnet.console

Thursday, June 25, 2015

Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, Part 9

In the previous part, we switched gears back to the Netgear R6200 upnpd after spending some time analyzing httpd. The HTTP daemon provided an understanding of how the firmware header is supposed to be constructed. We found a header parsing function in upnpd that was similar to its httpd counterpart. So similar that it has the same memcpy() buffer overflow. This overflow was more interesting this time around, as it did not require authentication. Additionally, we discovered a reference to the "Ambit image" via an error message string. Presumably an ambit image is a firmware format analogous to TRX. In this case, however, the ambit image encapsulates a TRX image.

In this part we will identify more fields of the Ambit header, as well as run up against a limitation of QEMU: attempts to open and write to the flash memory device will fail since, in emulation, there is no actual flash memory. We'll need to patch the upnpd binary in order to work around this. I previously covered binary patching for emulation here.

Updated Exploit Code

The janky_ambit_header.py module has been updated to reflect the additional fields we add to the header in this part. You can find the updated code and README in the part_9 directory. Now is a good time to do a pull or to clone the repository from:

We Should Have Checked the Firmware Size Before Now

The sa_CheckBoardID() function, analogous to abCheckBoardID() from httpd, returns success if the following is true:
  • The ambit magic number is found at offset 0.
  • The header size field doesn't overflow during the memcpy() operation
  • The checksum in the ambit header matches the header's actual checksum,
  • The proper board ID string is found and the end of the ambit header.
After sa_CheckBoardID(), at 0x00423CAC, we see several 32-bit fields parsed out. It remains to be seen how these values get used; presumably they are the same fields and get used the same way as in the httpd firmware validation. Then the size field from offset 24 is checked. It must be less than 0x400001, or 4194305, or firmware validation fails.

Check image size < 4MB


Somewhat ironically, this check can never fail, assuming the size field is truthful. If the firmware image is larger than this size, then upnpd will crash, having overflowed the 4MB buffer allocated for base64 decoding. In our proof-of-concept code, the size field contains a bogus value, and execution skips down to an error message.

Error message, image size too large


The error message belies someone's continued confusion over exactly how this capability is supposed to work. If the size validation fails, the error message is "The kernel image is over 512Kbytes!", although the test was against a 4MB upper limit.

Inserting the proper TRX image size (or "kernel size" as the error message indicates) at offset 24 gets past this step. After the check, a function is called at 0x0042428C, sa_upgrade_setImageInfo(), that parses out several more values from the header. Again, no validation is performed on these values at this point. It remains to be seen if they are the same fields and will be used in the same way as in httpd.

sa_upgrade_setImageInfo()


After this function is called, things begin to get interesting in a few ways. After a temporary "upgrade" file is created (but never used; wtf), /dev/mtd1 device is opened. You'll need to work around the fact that QEMU doesn't provide this device. The following following things will fail if not addressed.

First, opening mtd1 will fail if it doesn't already exist. Create an empty file to ensure the open() operation is successful.

open /dev/mtd1
Opening /dev/mtd1 with O_RDWR.


Next, a series of ioctl()s is performed on the open file descriptor. To understand what these operations do, it's helpful to refer to mtd.c from the OpenWRT source code as a guide.

Calling ioctl on /dev/mtd1


The first ioctl() will fail in emulation since we're just providing a regular file, not a device node. Patch out this operation with something that puts 0 in $v0, such as xor $v0,$v0.

Call to ioctl patched out.
ioctl is patched out.


This ioctl() we just patched out obtains, among other things, the erase size (i.e., block size) for the mtd device. We can simulate that result by patching at 0x0042453C where the the erase size is loaded into register $s5.

Obtain block size for mtd1.


It doesn't matter a great deal what you use for the erase size in emulation. The write loop will write the firmware in blocks of that size, then it will write any remaining fractional block at the end. An actual R6200 device reports a block size of 65536, or 0x10000, so that's a good number to use. Patching this instruction with:

lui $s5, 1

loads 1 into the upper half of register $s5 and 0x0 into the lower half, resulting in a value of 0x10000.

Patch to set block size 0x10000
Patch in a constant 0x10000 for mtd1 block size.


Next, in the basic block starting at 0x004245D0, there are two more ioctl()s. The first one most likely unlocks the current portion of flash for writing. The return value from it isn't checked, end execution immediately proceeds to the second. Based on the error message, the second one erases the block of flash so it can be rewritten. With our fake /dev/mtd1 there's no need to erase, so we can patch out this operation as before.

Patch out memerase ioctl
Patch out the ioctl() to erase flash memory.


Now, having patched out the ioctl()s that fail in emulation, writing to a regular file should work as normal. There is one more field that, while not validated directly, does affect what data gets written. When analyzing httpd, we discovered the field at offset 28 that contains the size of a theoretical second partition. In stock firmware this field is zeroed out. In upnpd, at 0x004245C0, this value is added to the address of the TRX image, and the result is the start of data that gets written to flash.

calculate start of firmware data
The start of firmware data is calculated.


In other words, the pointer to data that gets written is calculated as:

<Address of firmware image> + <ambit header size> + <partition 2 size> = <start of data to write>

This doesn't make sense and further belies the programmer's confusion over how this algorithm should work and how the firmware should be formatted. At any rate, if we zero out the field at byte 28, everything works fine. The address of the TRX image will be the start of data written to flash.

At this stage upnpd is ready to write our firmware to /dev/mtd1. Let's have a review of what portions of the ambit header had to be verified before getting here.

header diagram 2 alternate


There's our familiar ambit header. It looks similar to the header diagram from our httpd analysis, except there's still lot of gray in there. Only six fields have been validated by upnpd up to this point:

  • Ambit magic number
  • Header length
  • Header checksum
  • TRX image size (partition 1, aka "kernel")
  • Partition 2 size (not validated, but affects what gets written to flash)
  • Board ID string
That was easier than expected. When I sent the "firmware image" generated from random data to upnpd, my QEMU machine rebooted. This is because after the write loop, upnpd triggers a reboot so the new firmware will take effect. Our fake "/dev/mtd1" has even grown to 3.9MB as a result of the firmware writing.


zach@devaron $ ls -l mtd1
-rw-r--r-- 1 root 80 3900028 Mar 20 14:30 mtd1

At this point we've successfully exploited the SetFirmware UPnP SOAP action. We've gone as far as we can go with emulation. From here we'll move to physical hardware to test and develop the deployment of our firmware. In the next post, I'll describe connecting to the R6200 router's debug interface over its UART connection, so get your soldering iron ready.

Spoiler: I'll go ahead and say we're not quite home free yet. Don't attempt to generate an image and flash it to your router yet. At best, the write will still fail. At worst, you'll brick it. Besides not having generated a valid squashfs filesystem and TRX image, there at least two more header fields that will trip you up before you're done. Once we get access over UART figured out, it will be possible to recover a bricked device.

Thursday, June 18, 2015

Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, Part 8

In the previous few posts, we spent time reversing how the Netgear R6200's HTTP daemon parses a firmware header before writing the firmware image to flash. The goal was to work out how the 58-byte firmware header is constructed and how to generate a new one that can replace the header in a stock firmware. In the end we identified the purpose of all but 4 bytes. The regenerated header plus the original TRX firmware image allowed the HTTP daemon, running in emulation, to reach the stage where it would start writing data to the /dev/mtd1 flash partition. Considering this a win, we'll now circle back to analyzing upnpd.

In this and the next part, we'll compare the way upnpd parses and validates the firmware header to that of httpd. Having developed a baseline understanding of how the header is parsed by httpd, analyzing upnpd is much easier.

Updated Exploit Code

As in previous installments, the exploit code has been updated. Since we're switching back to upnpd in order to analyze how it validates the firmware, the repository contains separate modules for that. Look for janky_ambit_header.py and build_janky_fw.py. You can find the updated code and README in the part_8 directory. Now is a good time to do a pull or to clone the repository from:
https://github.com/zcutlip/broken_abandoned

More Firmware Parsing, Pretty Much Like Before

As we discovered in part 4, a firmware larger than 4MB will crash upnpd due to an undersized memory allocation. Obviously we won't be able to strap a header to the front of a stock TRX image like we did with httpd; it's way too big. Shrinking the firmware will be a challenge for later. If it turns out that we can't even get so far as writing the firmware to flash memory without crashing, it won't matter that you were able to shrink and re-pack the firmware. Instead, just dd out a little less than 4MB of random data from /dev/random and prepend a header to it. If you can get upnpd to write that image to flash, you win this stage and may advance to the next level.

Once we get past the undersized malloc() at 0x00423C24 in sa_parseRcvCmd(), the firmware is successfully base64 decoded out of the SOAP request. Then, at 0x00423C98, a function named sa_CheckBoardID() is called.

Call to sa_CheckBoardID


This function should be familiar. It's nearly identical to the abCheckBoardID() function I described in part 5. So identical, in fact, that the buffer overflow via memcpy() I described previously is in this function as well.

sa_CheckBoardID buffer overflow
Buffer overflow due to memcpy() using header size field. Sad trombone.

Even the Buffer Overflow is the Same


To recap, the memcpy() is bounded only by the size value from the header. Since we control that value, we get precise control over how many bytes are copied into the destination buffer.

I didn't go into detail about the buffer overflow before, because I wanted to wait until I could discuss it in the context of upnpd. In the HTTP server, this isn't an interesting vulnerability. In that case, it is a post-authentication vulnerability. You would need to bypass authentication or trick a user into uploading your malicious firmware. If you've accomplished either of those, there are much more useful things you can be doing with your time than exploiting buffer overflows.

In the case of upnpd, this same vulnerability doesn't require authentication, making it much more interesting. Here's what's neat about it:

  • No authentication required.
  • The payload is base64 encoded and decoded for free, so there are no bad bytes to avoid related to the transport protocol.
  • The buffer overflow is via memcpy() rather than a string handling function. There are no bad bytes to avoid related to string handling.
  • The buffer being overflowed is on the stack, making it easy to overwrite the function's return address.
This is a straightforward buffer overflow. If you're new to stack based buffer overflows, or just new to exploiting memory corruption vulnerabilities on MIPS, this is an easy one to practice with, especially if you have the debugging environment I described here set up.

However, as I said in the first part of this series, one of my self-imposed goals was to avoid exploiting bugs along the way. We're trying to flash a firmware without crashing, and any bugs along the way are obstacles to overcome.

Working through this function reveals the same header fields that we discovered in its httpd counterpart: The magic number, the size and checksum of the header, and the board ID string. These fields are found at the same header offsets as before.

Mystery Header Gets a Name

There is one new piece of information, however.

Not ambit image


At 0x00423088 there is an error message that we didn't see in httpd: "Not Ambit image ... reject!!!". This is the first indication of any sort of name for this file format. This explains why you may have noticed references to "ambit" or "ambit header" in previous code fragments I've posted.

In the next part, we get close to writing the firmware image to flash memory. We'll have to do some binary patching to work around the fact that QEMU doesn't actually have flash memory.

Monday, June 08, 2015

Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, Intermission

We're about halfway through the Broken, Abandoned series, so this is a good time to pause for a minute and take stock. At this point, things have gotten pretty technical; if you've only joined recently, you may be wondering what this series is about. I want to take a moment to summarize where we've been and where we can expect to go from here.

Overview

This series, entitled Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, is about an unauthenticated firmware update mechanism in the Netgear R6200 wireless router's UPnP service. Bypassing authentication and updating the firmware would be moderately interesting by itself. What makes this particularly interesting, however, is this capability appears only partially implemented. It's not quite dead code; more like zombie code. It's wired up just enough to kind of work. There are many artifacts of incomplete implementation that stand in the way of straightforward exploitation.

The goal: build an exploit that accounts for the many implementation bugs, which then updates the target with a custom firmware, giving us persistent control over the target device. This, of course, requires not just building the exploit, but specially crafting a firmware image.

Where We've Been

Here's a summary of what we've covered in the series up to now.

  • Part 1, part 2: Introduced the hidden SetFirmware SOAP action as well as the weird timing games needed to exploit it. We reverse engineered what HTTP headers are required to exercise this code path.
  • Part 3: We reverse engineered what the body of the SetFirmware SOAP request should look like.
  • Part 4: We discovered a crash when attempting to update to a stock firmware downloaded from Netgear's support website. The crash is due to an undersized memory allocation. We will have to shrink the firmware from nearly 9MB to 4MB in order to exploit the SetFirmware vulnerability.
  • Part 5, part 6, & part 7: It will be necessary to specially craft a firmware image if we are to take control of the target, so we reverse engineered the mystery 58-byte header at the beginning of the stock image. Because upnpd is so broken, we instead analyzed httpd, knowing that it can update a well-formed firmware image without crashing.

    Where We're Going

    From here there are still a number of challenges. We'll need to spend more time analyzing upnpd; it may not even be able to update the firmware without crashing (spoiler alert: it is). Even if it can, there may be differences in the firmware format as expected by upnpd vs the standard format parsed by httpd.

    Assuming we can get through upnpd's update process, there remains the problem from part 4: a firmware image greater than 4MB crashes upnpd. We'll need to spend some time shrinking the firmware from nearly 9MB to 4MB or less.

    Any project involving reverse engineering and customizing firmware will, at some point, result in bricked hardware. We'll devote an installment to discovering the hidden UART connection inside the R6200 that will enable recovery in the likely case of a bad firmware update.

    One installment will cover a upnpd crash after the firmware update process but before reboot. I'll discuss how to customize the firmware header to avoid the crash.

    The stage 1 firmware has a few things it must do autonomously if it is to reboot into a trojan stage 2. I'll discuss those things and how to accomplish them.

    We'll close out with an installment on post-exploitation. Once you're as far as customizing your own firmware and getting it onto your target, the world is your oyster. We'll discuss a simple technique that will yield remote, post-exploitation access, even from behind a firewall.

    While you're waiting here's a video of the exploit in action I shared in the prologue. In the left terminal you see what's going on under the hood via the serial console. In the right terminal, you see the actual exploitation taking place. Also, there's cool music.


    R6200 Firmware Upload from Zach on Vimeo.


    More to Come, so Stay Tuned

    Take a moment to go out to the lobby, stretch your legs, and use the facilities. We've covered a lot, but we're only halfway through. There's a lot more fun on the way, starting with Part 8!

    Thursday, June 04, 2015

    Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, Part 7

    In the previous post, I finished discussing the abCheckBoardID() function. I called attention to a checksum in the header generated by an unknown algorithm. I provided a python implementation of that algorithm ported from IDA disassembly. In total, I identified four fields parsed by this function, accounting for 30 bytes of the 58 byte header.

    In this part I'll give an overview of the remaining functions that parse and validate the firmware header. By the end we will be able to generate a header that allows the firmware to be programmed to flash memory. I won't discuss each header field in quite as much detail as I did previously, but if you've made it this far, it shouldn't be too hard to understand how each field is used.

    Updated Exploit Code

    The update to the exploit code for Part 6 added a module to regenerate a checksum found in the header. This update populates a couple of additional checksums as well as a few other fields. The code provided for Part 7 is sufficient to generate a firmware header that will pass the web server's validation. Given a valid kernel and filesystem image, you should be able to generate a firmware image that the web interface will happily upgrade to. If you've previously cloned the repository, now would be a good time to do a pull. You can clone the git repo from:
    https://github.com/zcutlip/broken_abandoned

    Of Checksums and Sizes

    After the abCheckBoardID() function (discussed in part 6) there are a few more functions that parse or validate portions of the header. Identifying these fields and their purpose is challenging due to the fact that values may be parsed out in one function, but not used until some other function or functions, if at all.

    The two functions that parse out values from the header are upgradeCgi_setImageInfo() at 0x004356B0 and upgradeCgiCheck() at 0x004361F8. The "setImageInfo" function is a short one. It parses several header fields, but it doesn't inspect or use any of them. The values are stored in global variables for later use. You can identify offsets of these fields using string patterns as described previously. As you identify these locations where the parsed values are located, rename the variables in IDA to something more meaningful, so you can identify them later when they are used. I renamed them to correspond with the offsets they were parsed from.

    upgradeCgi_setImageInfo
    Renaming global variables corresponding to header offsets.
    The upgradeCgiCheck() function validates a few fields parsed out previously. At 0x004362BC we see the return of our friend, calculate_checksum(). This time the checksum is computed across more than just the firmware header. At the "update" step, the data argument points to the "HDR0" portion of the firmware. This suggests the checksum is across the TRX image that follows the 58 byte header. The size argument is the sum of the values found at offsets 24 and 28. Inspecting the values at those positions in a stock firmware, we see 0x00871000 at offset 24, and 0x0 at offset 28. It's clear that bytes 24 - 27 are the size of the firmware image minus the 58 bytes at the start. Based on its use here, the bytes 28 - 31 are also a size of some sort.

    At any rate, the size passed to calculate_checksum() at the update stage at 0x004362DC is the size of the TRX image. At 0x0043630C, the checksum is compared to the value taken from offset 32. We now know three more fields in the firmware header: offsets 24, 28, and 32. That's 42 bytes down, 16 to go.

    checksuming TRX image
    Checksum of the firmware's TRX image.


    We're not done with checksums just yet. The basic block at 0x0043643C is another checksum operation. Once again the data points to "HDR0", but the size is only the value from offset 24. The size from offset 28 is not used this time. The checksum result is the same as before, but this time compared to the value at offset 16. We now know the checksum we compute and store at offset 32 must also be stored at offset 16.

    At this point we can speculate this firmware format supports multiple partitions or sections. The value at offset 24 would be the size of partition 1, and offset 28 would be the size of partition 2. The checksum at offset 16 would be calculated over partition 1, and offset 32's checksum would be calculated over partitions 1 and 2 combined.

    We're now down to 12 unidentified bytes. Let's have a look at an updated header diagram to see how things look.

    header diagram 2
    What we know so far about the firmware header.


    The diagram is starting to fill in, and things are looking quite a bit better.

    Version String

    Moving on, at 0x00436580, more data is parsed out of the firmware image. This time the values are pulled out one byte at a time. This frustrates the technique of using the 3+ byte patterns to identify offsets. Based on the format strings from subsequent sscanf() and sprintf() operations, we can speculate that these values are transformed in some way into the version string displayed in the web interface.

    Although the version string ends up being only cosmetic, and not an essential part of the firmware validation, it's still interesting enough to discuss here. Modifying the version string would be a nice way to visually demonstrate that the target is, in fact, running your custom firmware, and not the stock firmware.
    [Update: Turns out this isn't quite right. There is a string table stored in flash memory that also contains the version string, and that string is displayed in the web interface. The version field in the firmware header is only (as far as I can tell) rendered during the update process so the user can see what version they're updating to.]

    It took some debugging, but it turns out the single byte values that compose the version string don't actually get used until a few functions later, in upgradeCgi_GetParam() at 0x00436B4C.

    generating firmware version string


    What is happening here is a version string is being generated to display in the web browser so that the user can confirm what version of the firmware they're about to upgrade to.

    Firmware Version String


    The version string "V65.97.51.65_97.52.65" from the screenshot above appears to be composed of the decimal representations of ASCII characters from Bowcaster's pattern string. We can be sure by replacing bytes 8 - 15 with a string of non-repeating characters: "stuvwxyz". When we do this, the version string becomes "V116.117.118.119_120.121.122". This confirms the hypothesis; these are the decimal representations for t,u,v,w,x,y, and z. Note that "s" is not included. Even though byte 8 was parsed out along with the rest, it appears to go unused.

    Firmware Version String 2

    We can now update the header diagram to reflect the version bytes.
    header diagram 3


    (Mostly) Complete Firmware Header

    The header diagram now has only 4 bytes (5 if you count the unused version byte at offset 8) that haven't been identified. It's unclear what these bytes are for, since they are never inspected. A likely explanation is that a checksum for theoretical partition 2 belongs at offset 20. The stock firmware has 0x0 at offset 20, which jives with a partition 2 size of 0. At any rate, this header is sufficient for execution to reach the point where the uploaded firmware gets written to /dev/mtd1.

    WARNING: If you are debugging httpd on on actual hardware rather than in emulation, there's a chance your router will end up bricked if you attempt to upgrade to a customer firmware image. Eventually, we must test on actual hardware, but before then, I'll describe how to access the device's serial console using a UART to USB cable. Using the serial console, you can recover from a bad firmware update, a feature I had to use many times during my original research.

    In the next part, with a better understanding of the firmware format, we'll loop back to the UPnP daemon and pick up where we left off there. Wouldn't it be nice if we could use the now documented header format to generate a firmware that will work with the UPnP daemon using our existing exploit code?

    Thursday, May 28, 2015

    Broken, Abandoned, and Forgotten Code, Part 6

    Note: It is assumed that the reader is debugging the processes described in this and the next several posts using emulation and IDA Pro. Those topics are outside the scope of this series and are covered in detail here and here.

    In the previous post, we switched gears and started looking at the web server for the Netgear  R6200. That's because the HTTP daemon's code for upgrading the firmware is less broken and easier to analyze. We also analyzed a stock firmware image downloaded from Netgear to see how it is composed. Craig Heffner's binwalk identified three parts, a TRX header at offset 58, followed by a compressed Linux kernel, followed by a squashfs filesystem. All of those parts are well understood, which only leaves the first 58 bytes to analyze.

    With the goal of recreating the header using a stock TRX header, Linux kernel, and filesystem, I described how we can use Bowcaster to create fake header data to aid in debugging. When we left off, I had started discussing httpd's abCheckBoardID() function at 0x0041C3D8, which partially parses the firmware header. We identified a magic signature that should be at the firmware image's offset 0, as well as some sort of size field that should be at offset 4. We also discovered this header should be big endian encoded even though the target system is little endian.

    In this part, we'll clarify the purpose of the size field as well as identify a checksum field. Identification of the checksum algorithm is tricky if you don't have an eye for that sort of thing (I do not). I'll show how to deal with that. By the end of this part, we will have identified four fields, accounting for 30 bytes of the 58-byte firmware header.

    Updated Exploit Code

    I last updated the exploit code for part 5, which added several Python modules to aid in reverse engineering and reconstructing a firmware image. In this part I've added a module to regenerate checksums found in the header (see below). Additionally, the MysteryHeader class populates a couple of new fields that we will cover this post. If you've previously cloned the repository, now would be a good time to do a pull. You can clone the git repo from:
    https://github.com/zcutlip/broken_abandoned

    Header Size

    We know the field at offset 4 is a size field of some sort because it's used as the size for a memcpy() operation[1]. Let's take a look at a stock firmware image to see what value is in that field. It might correlate to something obvious.

    stock firmware hex dump

    Above, we see the stock value is 0x0000003A, or 58 in decimal. Since 58 is also the amount of unidentified data before the TRX header, it's a safe bet this field is the overall size of this unidentified header. It's also a safe bet that this header is variable in size. The TRX header, whose size is fixed, does not have a size field for the header alone, only for the header plus data.

    call to calculate_checksum()
    Checksumming the firmware header.

    Checksum Fun

    From abCheckBoardID() there are several calls to the calculate_checksum() function. This is an imported symbol and is not in the httpd binary itself. Strings analysis of libraries on the R6200's filesystem reveals that this function is in the shared library libacos_shared.so. We can disassemble this binary and analyze the function.


    libacos_shared.so calculate_checksum()
    Disassembly of calculate_checksum().
    There's no need to completely reverse engineer this function. Sure, it would be convenient to know what checksum algorithm this is[2] and if there was a built-in python module to use. All we really need, however, is code that calculates the same values this function does. It's easier in this case to just reimplement the algorithm. I duplicated this function one-for-one, where each line of MIPS disassembly became a line of Python. It's a small function, so it didn't take long to do. That module is included in this week's update to the git repo.

    Checksum Python reimplementation
    Python code fragment that looks suspiciously like IDA Pro disassembly.


    A checksum is calculated across the first 58 bytes of the header. Then at 0x0041C5BC the checksum gets compared to 0x41623241, a value extracted from the firmware data. Using Bowcaster's find_offset(), it is revealed that offset 36 of the firmware header should contain the checksum of the header itself. We'll need to calculate that value for the header and insert it at this location. In abCheckBoardID() the checksum field is zeroed out before the value is calculated. We should do the same before calculating our own. The updated code in the git repository performs this operation.

    Board ID String

    With the header checksum in place, we can move forward to the next few basic blocks. A few checks are performed to verify the "board_id" string of the firmware. There are a couple of hard-coded board_id strings that are referenced. If neither of those match, NVRAM is queried to find out the running device's board_id. It's possible to verify the proper board ID is "U12H192T00_NETGEAR" by extracting the NVRAM parameters from a live device[3]. Even if we didn't have that information, we could still analyze a stock firmware, where we find the same string embedded in the header.

    R6200-V1.0.0.28_1.0.24.chk


    As before, by looking at the pattern string that is compared, we can identify the offset into the header where the board_id should be placed.


    strcmp board_id


    $ ./buildfw.py find=b3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8A kernel.lzma squashfs.bin
     [@] Building firmware from input files: ['kernel.lzma', 'squashfs.bin']
     [@] TRX crc32: 0x0ee839c0
     [@] Creating ambit header.
     [+] Building header without checksum.
     [+] Calculating header checksum.
     [@] Calculated header checksum: 0x840d0ddd
     [+] Building header with checksum.
     [@] Finding offset of b3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8A
     [+] Offset: 40
    


    The string b3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8A is located at offset 40.

    It is worth noting that we suspected the header was variable length given the presence of a size field. The board_id is a string and is the last field in the header; it is likely responsible for the header's variable length.

    At any rate, this is easy to add as a string section using Bowcaster. This is the last check in abCheckBoardID().

    The Mystery Header So Far

    Here's a diagram of what we know about the header so far.
    header diagram 1


    That's four fields identified, for a total of 30 bytes. 28 bytes remain. Although the abCheckBoardID() function only inspected these four fields, it did populate several integers in the global header_buf structure. It remains to be seen how these fields get used.

    Based on this information we can enhance the Python code to add the necessary fields. Updated code in part_6 of the git repo looks similar to:


    from bowcaster.development import OverflowBuffer
    from bowcaster.development import SectionCreator
    
    class MysteryHeader(object):
        MAGIC="*#$^"
        MAGIC_OFF=0
        
        HEADER_SIZE=58
        HEADER_SIZE_OFF=4
        
        HEADER_CHECKSUM_OFF=36
        
        BOARD_ID="U12H192T00_NETGEAR"
        BOARD_ID_OFF=40
        
        def __init__(self,endianness,image_data,size=HEADER_SIZE,board_id=BOARD_ID,logger=None):
            self.endianness=endianness
            self.size=size
            self.board_id=board_id
            
            
            chksum=0;
            logger.LOG_INFO("Building header without checksum.")
            header=self.__build_header(checksum=chksum,logger=logger)
            logger.LOG_INFO("Calculating header checksum.")
            chksum=self.__checksum(header)
            logger.LOG_INFO("Building header with checksum.")
            header=self.__build_header(checksum=chksum,logger=logger)
            self.header=header
            
        def __build_header(self,checksum=0,logger=None):
            
            SC=SectionCreator(self.endianness,logger=logger)
            SC.string_section(self.MAGIC_OFF,self.MAGIC,
                                description="Magic bytes for header.")
            SC.gadget_section(self.HEADER_SIZE_OFF,self.size,"Size field representing length of header.")
            
            SC.gadget_section(self.HEADER_CHECKSUM_OFF,checksum)
            SC.string_section(self.BOARD_ID_OFF,self.board_id,
                                description="Board ID string.")
            buf=OverflowBuffer(self.endianness,self.size,
                                overflow_sections=SC.section_list,
                                logger=logger)
    
        def __checksum(self,header):
            data=str(header)
            size=len(data)
            chksum=LibAcosChecksum(data,size)
            return chksum.checksum
    

    In the next post I'll discuss other functions that parse portions of the header. I'll show how to identify what fields get used where. By the end of the next installment we'll be able to generate a header sufficient to get our firmware image written to flash.

    -------------------------------
    [1] Wah wah...Buffer overflow.
    [2] I'm pretty sure it's Fletcher32. I believe this because I asked Dion Blazakis, and he thinks it is, and that dude is smart. Also I found a Fletcher32 implementation on Google Code by Ange Albertini that gives the same result as mine. And that guy is also smart.
    [3] The NVRAM configuration can be extracted from /dev/mtd14. This, plus libnvram-faker is covered independently of this series, in Patching, Emulating, and Debugging a Netgear Embedded Web Server